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The Third Dimension of Victimization 
 
 
Mary Graw Leary*  
 




The criminal law serves unique and critical purposes in society.  It defines 
minimal conduct and safeguards commonly shared social interests.  It has the 
potential to protect members of the community, prevent victimization, and punish 
those when such protection and prevention fail.  Crime itself has been defined as a 
voluntary act that causes a social harm.2  Thus, the “social harm” caused by a 
criminal act rests at the very bedrock of criminal law.  That social harm sought to 
be prevented has been defined as “the negation, endangering, or destruction of an 
individual, group, or state interest which is deemed socially valuable[.]”3  At its 
very core, the criminal law seeks to prevent endangerment of socially valuable 
interests. 
New social values emerge as society evolves, as do to novel methods of 
victimizing people.  Ideally, the criminal law identifies these new forms of 
victimization and, if they compromise a socially valuable interest, the law 
condemns such behavior as criminal.  At times, this evolution has been the result 
of changed social values.  For example, prohibition, the criminalization of 
adultery, and the non-criminalization of marital rape reflect formerly held social 
values that are no longer prevalent in modern society.   
However, criminal law does not change only because of evolving social 
values.  The criminal law must also respond to more structural changes in society 
that lead to innovative forms of victimization.  For example, in its very early days, 
the criminal law of theft did not solely protect property interests, but a host of 
                                                                                                                                          
*   Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.  Special 
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perfect reference librarian, and Rana Cullers for numerous drafts.  A special word of thanks to Paul 
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1   What Are Elements of Sound Data Breach Legislation: Hearing on HIF027.170 Before 
H.R., Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg, and Trade, Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 22 
(2015) (statement of Rep. Marsha Blackburn).  
2   See, e.g., Albin Eser, The Principle of “Harm” in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 386 (1965). 
3   Id. at 413. 
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social interests implicating security.4  The advent of property ownership brought 
about the development of more sophisticated property crimes beyond larceny to 
include embezzlement, larceny by trick, and false pretenses.  Similarly, criminal 
law once reflected only malum in se crimes.  Consequently, malum prohibitum 
crimes developed as society became more complex and legislatures dealt with an 
increasing number of potential victimizations.  While such structural changes are 
not commonplace, they demand significant shifts in the criminal law to protect the 
community and socially valued interests that emerge. 
The time has come for such a shift.  Traditionally, when addressing individual 
victims, the criminal law functions in two dimensions: crimes against the person 
and crimes against property.5  This modality is outdated.  With the advent of the 
Internet, electronic commerce, and numerous digital platforms at the very core of 
modern American existence, modern American criminal law must recognize a 
third dimension of victimization of individuals: crimes against the digital extension 
of the person.   
This article advocates for consideration of a restructuring of criminal laws at a 
basic level.  It argues for the recognition of a third dimension of victimization.  
States must review criminal codes and restructure them to recognize the many new 
forms of victimization that are achieved digitally.  Because of the uniquely 
pernicious harms of digital victimization, current criminal codes are insufficient.  
They fail to capture both the social value being protected and the harms 
accomplished through these digital victimizations.  This article argues that one’s 
digital presence can, in fact, be an extension of oneself.  As such, one’s digital self 
can be harmed in ways that are distinct from our current understanding of personal 
or property crimes.  This form of victimization should be recognized by the 
criminal law, and the social interests in protecting individuals in this dimension 
should be reflected in the criminal law.   
Part II explores the purpose of criminal law and argues that criminal codes do 
not achieve their purpose when they fail to sufficiently address these digital 
victimizations.  Part III describes the emergence of the digital self and the unique 
harms that the digital self suffers.  Part IV explores areas of criminal law that have 
made similar adaptations, arguing that this history supports recognizing this new 
paradigm.  Part V analyzes current de facto recognitions of the digital self in the 
criminal law.  Finally, Part VI describes what form such a criminal law 
restructuring should take in order to reflect these modern values and fulfill the 
promise of criminal law in society.  It advocates for adding a third dimension of 
                                                                                                                                          
4   GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §1.3.1, at 31 (Boston: Little Brown, 1st ed. 
1978). But see Eser, supra note 2, at 349 (arguing that the historical context of defining “harm” in the 
criminal realm has become irrelevant). 
5   See e.g., NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM, CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS, 
PROPERTY, AND SOCIETY (2011),  http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/2011/resources/crimes-
against-persons-property-and-society).  While most criminal codes contain other forms of crime, they 
usually involve victims who are not individuals.  For example, terrorism and treason are crimes 
against the state itself.  This article addresses only crimes as they relate to individuals. 
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victimization: crimes against the digital person as an extension of the physical 
person. 
 
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
It is axiomatic that the criminal law is distinct from civil law.  Through 
litigation, civil laws allow members of the community to obtain redress from each 
other.  The civil law is almost procedural and provides a path of legal redress to 
replace self-help.  While an important component of society, the civil law is, in 
some senses, less “majestic” than the criminal law in that the criminal law speaks 
on behalf of society.   
The criminal law produces a conviction, not a decision.  As Henry Hart noted 
over half a century ago, a conviction is “a formal and solemn pronouncement of 
the moral condemnation of the community.”6  The criminal law reflects both the 
shared values of a community and the shared belief that endangering such values 
demands, not only redress, but community condemnation.  As a practical matter, 
the remedies in the context of the civil law are often available only to those who 
have engaged in a cost-benefit analysis of seeking redress and have determined 
they have the capability (financial, emotional, or temporal) to seek redress.   
In the context of personal crimes, however, the criminal law signifies much 
more than a procedural pathway but also a substantive one.  Society pursues the 
criminal law because a suspected wrongdoer has injured society as a whole, in 
addition to harming an individual, by breaking the social code.  The cases are 
captioned with the charging party as the State, the People, the Commonwealth, or 
the United States.  This is far more than symbolic: it signifies that the community 
itself brings a criminal action against a defendant because that defendant has 
harmed a member of the community, and the community will not stand for such an 
infraction.  Therefore, the criminal law is not simply a procedural mechanism for 
redress, but it is a substantive one because the community imposes the criminal 
law against an offender to protect one of its members from victimization. 
Recognizing this distinction, one must examine the goals of such a system of 
redress on behalf of the community.  As a threshold matter, the criminal law 
contains many distinct goals, including contributing to social order, preventing 
crimes, protecting victims, inducing socially positive behavior, punishing socially 
negative behavior, and rehabilitating those who have committed a crime.7  
Although characterized by many goals, these principles do not necessarily wholly 
exclude the others.8  Central to this system is the judgment of the community.9 
                                                                                                                                          
6   Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 
(Summer 1958), reprinted in CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIETY 61, 65 (Abraham S. Goldstein & Joseph 
Goldstein eds., 1971).  
7   Id. at 61. 
8   Id. at 62. 
9   Id. at 65. 
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[T]he criminal law has an obviously significant and, indeed, a fundamental 
role to play in the effort to create the good society.  For it is the criminal law which 
defines the minimum conditions of man’s responsibility to his fellows and holds 
him to that responsibility.10 
 
Therefore, one primary goal of the criminal law is to reflect a moral code of 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior within the community.11  Regarding 
personal crime, however, the acceptability of the behavior is related to the finding 
that the “conduct is deemed sufficiently injurious to interest of the individual or 
community to warrant the protection of the criminal law.”12  Once the social injury 
that the society seeks to condemn is identified, the criminal law reflects a shared 
moral code.   
Embedded in this concept is that the criminal law seeks to protect society as a 
whole and its individual members from harm.13  This is accomplished first by 
defining conduct that is deemed socially injurious and then seeking to induce 
“conformity to the rule.”14  That inducement can be achieved through this 
definition as well as punishment when the prevention of crime fails.15  Thus, the 
criminal law functions to “equip[] the proposed social order with adequate tools to 
discourage undesired conduct[.]”16 
These several complementary purposes of the criminal law cannot be 
achieved if the code itself is without legitimization.  Hence, the code must reflect 
commonly shared values.  As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, “[t]he first 
requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond to the actual 
feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.”17  The criminal 
law, therefore, fails when it does not reflect commonly understood harms. 
The current criminal law system does not adequately reflect commonly 
understood harms.  As the next sections elaborate, the digital world has opened a 
                                                                                                                                          
10  Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 410 
(Summer 1958). 
11  1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW §1, at 10–12 (15th Ed. 1993). 
12  Id. at §1. 
13  LIVINGSTON HALL & SHELDON GLUECK, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 8 
(1951). 
14  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Theories of Punishment and the External Standard (1881), 
reprinted in CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIETY 27, 32 (Abraham S. Goldstein & Joseph Goldstein eds., 
1971); see also Hart, supra note 6, at 67  (“The commands of the criminal law are commands which 
public interest requires people to comply with.”). 
15  WHARTON’S, supra note 11, §1, at 10–12. 
16  Hart, supra note 6, at 68. 
17  Holmes, supra note 14, at 27; see also Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey Goodwin, Michael 
Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1942 (2010)(noting the importance of 
criminal law earning a reputation of moral authority by reflecting a community’s “shared intuition of 
justice.”). 
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new dimension of victimization previously not seen in society.  While many other 
disciplines have documented the unique social harms resulting from various forms 
of victimization, the criminal law has not sufficiently followed in this trend.  This 
is due, in part, to the unique role of the criminal law, which demands caution 
before recognizing new forms of victimization.  “The law draws its life juices from 
custom and public opinion.  It cannot be too far in advance of these without 
shriveling from want of public support.”18  However, the time has come to add a 
third dimension of victimization to our criminal codes: the victimization of the 
digital self. 
 
III. THE UNIQUE HARMS TO THE DIGITAL SELF 
 
A. The Digital Self is an Extension of the Physical Self 
 
Criminal codes typically refer to “personal crimes” or “crimes against the 
person” to specifically reference crimes against the physical persons.  For centuries 
this categorization was sufficient.  When an individual was assaulted, threatened, 
or endangered, the harm was generally to his or her physical body.   
The concept of the “digital self” or “digital person” arose from the early days 
of the Internet and the increased role of the digital world in everyday life.  This 
concept, referred to as one’s “digital footprint,” that leaves traces throughout the 
digital world.  It includes information individuals themselves have placed into the 
digital world through social networking profiles, blog posts, and other forms of 
self-created digital content that combine to form a “digital profile.”  It also 
includes, however, information collected about individuals without their consent, 
even including information placed on the Internet connected to the individual’s 
identity but not endorsed by the individual.  Examples of this type of information 
include false information, incorrect information, or intentionally hurtful 
information.  While the individual’s physical self and the individual’s digital self 
were at one time two distinct personas, over time, the digital and physical selves 
have arguably merged—becoming somewhat indistinguishable.   
The overlap and blurring of the individual’s digital and physical selves have 
manifested in a number of ways.  For example, teens primarily communicate not 
through in person connections or even through a telephone, but through texting.19  
One of the most primary forms of communication is through social media—one 
digital profile sharing information with a whole network of digital profiles.20  
                                                                                                                                          
18  HALL & GLUECK, supra note 13, at 10. 
19  See David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of 
Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 270–71 (2010); Amanda Lenhart, Teen, Social 
Media, and Technology Overview, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 4–6 (2015) (noting the prevalence on 
teen texting as a form of communication), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-
media-technology-2015/.  
20  See Ardia, supra note 19, at 303—10. 
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Usually, individuals voluntarily create social profiles and place these digital 
versions of themselves online.  However, employers often require their employees 
to place profiles through social platforms such as LinkedIn or Facebook for 
employment purposes.21  In this way, an employee’s “professional self” takes on a 
digital form, as well as a physical one, in the business world.   
Basic components of daily life now occur online, including bill paying, 
banking, and video and audio communications.  In short, our digital selves are no 
longer compartmentalized from our physical selves; they are, in fact, extensions of 
ourselves.  Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) scholar, Sherry Turkle, 
describes it this way: 
 
I once described the computer as a second self, a mirror of mind.  Now 
the metaphor no longer goes far enough.  Our new devices provide space 
for the emergence of a new state of the self, itself, split between the 
screen and the physical real, wired into existence through technology.22 
 
Many other scholars have recognized Turkle’s concept of the “new state of 
self.”  Daniel Solove recognized a similar concept when he coined the term “digital 
dossier.”23  John Palfrey and Urs Gasser describe the “digital dossier” as all the 
personally-identifiable digital information associated with one’s name, and they 
further discuss one’s digital identity as a subset of information “composed of all 
those data elements that are disclosed online to third parties, whether it is by 
[one’s] choice or not.” 24  Furthermore, Palfrey and Gasser discuss the implications 
of this reality regarding “digital natives.”  “[W]e are just at the beginning of the 
digital age. . ..  Digital Natives will be the first to experience the compounding 
effects of the creation of identities and digital dossiers over a long period of time . . 
..  The extent of the damage caused by harmful information—in terms of who can 
access it, when, how, and over what period of time—continues to increase as the 
use of technology increases.” 25 
                                                                                                                                          
21  See, e.g., Lisa Quast, Recruiting, Reinvented: How Companies Are Using Social Media In 
The Hiring Process, FORBES (May 21, 2012, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lisaquast/2012/05/21/recruiting-reinvented-how-companies-are-using-
social-media-in-the-hiring-process/. 
22  SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY AND LESS 
FROM EACH OTHER 16 (2012). 
23  Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. 
CAL L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2002) (describing digital dossiers as “digital biographies, a horde of 
aggregated bits of information combined to reveal a portrait of who we are based upon what we buy, 
the organizations we belong to, how we navigate the Internet, and which shows and videos we 
watch”). 
24  JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF 
DIGITAL NATIVES 40 (2010). 
25  Id. at 62–63 (defining digital native as a person born in the digital age (post 1980) who has 
access to net-worked technologies, with strong computer skills and knowledge).   
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While an individual once had a separate physical self and a distinct digital 
self, these two worlds have now merged together to some extent.  Global 
communication has led to the reality that entities once so personal, such as 
reputation and privacy, are no longer related to concepts of physical space.26  This 
boundary between the physical self and the digital self continues to dissipate.27  As 
discussed infra, the digital self can be harmed and that harm, in turn, can harm the 
actual self.  The most common examples of this “harm cycle” include cyber 
bullying, threats, stalking, “revenge pornography” or “involuntary pornography,” 
and identity theft.  This is especially true for younger people who develop their 
social identities through their digital selves, which can heavily influence the 
shaping of their actual self.28  This evolution from separate physical and digital 
selves to a merged continuous sense of self demonstrates two realities.  First, the 
digital person is an extension of oneself.  Second, as a consequence, a person can 
suffer harm as a result of an attack on the digital person.    
 
B. The Harms to the Digital Self are Uniquely Pernicious and Inadequately 
Recognized in the Criminal Law 
 
Given the examples above, one might argue that the criminal law already 
recognizes harms to the person, and there is no need to alter the criminal law to 
recognize an entirely new category of victimization.  However, such a view fails to 
recognize that the harms to the digital person, as an extension of oneself, are 
uniquely pernicious and deserve a separate and distinct category. 
When crime was limited to the physical world, it was limited to the finite 
world.  For example, a physical restraint, legal protective order, or the relocation of 
the victim could thwart a stalker.  Today, that stalker can now utilize the Internet to 
find the victim, continue to stalk the victim online, and effectively always be 
within reach of the victim.  “In the past, much personal information was publicly 
inaccessible because of practical impediments.  The Internet is largely eliminating 
those impediments.”29  While a stalking victim in the past may have felt as though 
the stalker was omnipresent, today the stalker is virtually omnipresent.  This kind 
of “omnipresent” harm is distinctly different and unique from traditional concepts 
of stalking.   
                                                                                                                                          
26  Ardia, supra note 19, at 306. 
27  Jagdish N. Sheth & Michael R. Solomon, Extending the Extended Self in a Digital World, 
22 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC.125–26 (2014) (discussing the concepts of digital fusion between 
the physical self and online life as facilitated through technology).   
28  Shanyang Zhao, The Digital Self: Through the Looking Glass of Telecopresent Others, 28 
SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 387, 395 (2005) (discussing formation of self-conceptualization as it relates 
to the digital self and noting that it is “impossible to separate the digital self from other aspects of a 
person’s self-repository”). 
29  Ardia, supra note 19, at 262; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STALKING 
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2 (May 2001). 
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Cyber bullying offers another illustration.  In the past, a victim of bullying 
would be concerned that the bully would injure the victim’s reputation in a given, 
finite community such as a school, neighborhood, or town.  For example, a young 
person bullied by classmates may believe that the bullying would occur only at 
school.  “Global communications networks such as the Internet have made 
reputation more enduring and yet more ephemeral.  Reputation is more enduring 
because information about us, whether good or bad, can exist—and be easily 
retrievable—forever.”30  Indeed, information injurious to individuals literally exists 
for all time in the form of blog posts, social networking statements, and “vast 
online data repositories” that can be accessed at any time by any individual.31  
Again, while in the past a victim of bullying may have felt as though the entire 
world was being told something personal, today a victim is being injured before 
the world.  These “cyber attackers,” whether cyber bullies, cyber stalkers, or other 
cyber criminals, take advantage of the free anonymous Internet that allows them to 
victimize their targets in real time from anywhere in the world.32 
Similarly, crimes such as identity theft have taken on a more universal 
omnipresent character.  This crime once required an offender to physically obtain a 
credit card and physically use it in the physical world, thus incurring some risk.  
Now, an offender can obtain the credit card number and utilize it to buy items 
online or exploit the information he can derive from it without ever physically 
possessing the card or identification.33 
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this extension of self in the 
context of sexually-abusive images of children, commonly referred to as “child 
pornography.”  In finding that a victim of such images is harmed again each time a 
possessor of such images views her image, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is 
common ground that the victim suffers continuing and grievous harm as a result of 
her knowledge that a large, indeterminate number of individuals have viewed and 
will in the future view images of sexual abuse she endured.”34  In fact, the Court 
characterized the viewing of these images as repeating the sexual abuse crime 
itself.35  While the Court had previously acknowledged that such images may be 
more harmful to victims than the initial abuse, the Court specifically noted that the 
Internet itself changed the nature of the harm.36 
                                                                                                                                          
30  Ardia, supra note 19, at 262. 
31  Id. 
32  Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combatting Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1103, 
1111–14 (2011). 
33  See, e.g., S.B. 3566, 201st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015). 
34  Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1726 (2014). 
35  Id. at 1717. 
36  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 & n.10; Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1717  (“Because 
child pornography is now traded with ease on the Internet, ‘the number of still images and 
videos memorializing the sexual assault and other sexual exploitation of children, many very young 
in age, has grown exponentially.’”). 
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The law has at times given voice to the digital harms suffered.  However, 
given the profound and unique harm associated with this form of victimization, the 
traditional law and its categorization are too limiting and inadequate.37   
 
IV. THE CRIMINAL LAW ADAPTS 
 
It is not novel for the criminal law to embark on such a fundamental shift.  
Given some of the aforementioned purposes of the criminal law, it is necessary that 
the criminal law reflects the contemporarily shared values of the present.  That 
said, the criminal law is not the only social structure to address social ills, and 
legislatures are wise to move cautiously when considering significant alterations.  
The law cannot respond to every social ill through criminalization.  Given the slow 
progress of legislative efforts, many forms of victimization will have changed 
between the time of the legislation’s conception and its passage, thus making the 
law obsolete before it takes effect.  This reality is compounded when the need for 
change is driven by rapidly evolving technologies.   
Nonetheless, when the societal landscape has gone through substantial 
changes, the criminal law must do so as well.  This has occurred many times in 
history on very fundamental levels.  It has also occurred with more minor but still 
significant changes with technology, such as theft, stalking and harassment, and 
reputational harm. 
Criminal laws deal not only with private wrongs, but also address public 
wrongs.  As such, when society evolves and recognizes a form of victimization as 
negating a socially valuable interest, the criminal law must change to address this 
shift in societal perspective.   
 
The concept of a public wrong is the product of a social evolution, and 
whether an act has been or is deemed to be a public injury or menace 
depends upon the stage of civilization and the conditions which confront 
a people.…Different conditions thus become the cause of different 
laws.38 
 
These changes can be fundamental.  William Nelson’s study of the 
transformation of the criminal law during the Revolutionary Era is a clear 
demonstration of this.39  Between 1760 and 1810, the criminal law in the colonies 
radically shifted from the primary purpose of enforcing Puritan laws of morality to 
the more modern goal of protecting people and property.40  Blackstone had 
                                                                                                                                          
37  See generally Lipton, supra note 32, at 1111–12. 
38  1 WM. L. BURDICK, THE LAW OF CRIME §3 (1946). 
39  William E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era, 
42 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 450 (1967), reprinted in CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIETY 73 (Abraham S. Goldstein & 
Joseph Goldstein eds., 1971).   
40  Id. at 74. 
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developed in Great Britain a concept of classifying crimes that had been largely 
ignored in the colonies in favor of using the law to regulate sin.  However, “[t]he 
years after the revolution brought forth vast changes in attitudes toward crime and 
the criminal.  Prosecutions for various ‘immoral’ actions ceased while 
economically motivated crimes and prosecutions, greatly increased.”41  This 
increase was driven not only by evolving standards, but also by the practical 
realities of daily life.  Society was seeing an increase in economic disparity and the 
urban poor, which society saw as a cause of an increased number of thefts.  
Moreover, it reflected a new consideration in the criminal law: assessing the 
victimization aspects of a suspect’s behavior and thereby determining that to be 
worthy of condemnation.42  The criminal law was seen as having the purpose of 
preserving social order and the integrity of property, not as preserving morality per 
se.43 
Indeed the evolution of theft and larceny itself demonstrates a significant 
societal shift in the criminal law.  Interestingly, in its early history, theft was not 
criminalized solely as a property concept due to the lack of actual property 
ownership among the masses and the common people.  While robbery was 
punishable, the crime was developed in the only framework essentially available in 
the common law: a crime against a person.44  With, among other events, the major 
societal transformation of property ownership, the courts began to recognize and 
expand the crime of larceny.  However, as the concept of property further 
developed, the common law kept molding the crime of larceny to fit into new 
kinds of theft, such as theft by false pretense and larceny by trick.45  With the 
growth of more complex business transactions and various methods of depriving 
victims of property, the criminal law developed even further to include fraud and 
other situations to supplement the crime of theft.46 
Just as a call for a change in the criminal law to recognize a new societal harm 
is not novel, the notion that technology drives some fundamental changes is also 
not new.  Defamation law, although not criminal, offers a clear example.  This 
body of law began in feudal times, expanded with the advent of the printing press, 
and later was constitutionalized by the Supreme Court with the emergence of 
broadcast and mass media.47  Ardia argues that this body of law is again at a 
crossroads with the decrease of broadcast media but with the increase in online 
platforms such as social networking sites, blogs, and social media accounts.  He 
                                                                                                                                          
41  Id. at 77. 
42  Id. at 82 (“The criminal in 1810 was no longer envisioned as a sinner against God, but 
rather as one who preyed upon his fellow citizens.”). 
43  Id. at 83. 
44  HALL & GLUECK, supra note 13, at 165. 
45  See id. at 165–71. 
46  See id. at 165. 
47  Ardia, supra note 19, at 262. 
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further comments that these new developments have “profoundly altered” 
defamation law, and this body of law needs to follow suit.48 
While not categorized as a crime, defamation law is not wholly unrelated to 
the crimes of cyber stalking/harassment or threats.  The traditional versions of 
these crimes were once limited to the physical world; however, new technologies 
such as online and digital communications have altered the landscape with the 
criminal law following.  Before the 1990s, stalkers victimized people, mostly 
women, but law enforcement was without a mechanism to respond.  These victims 
suffered profound harms relating to stress, fear, and financial cost of relocation or 
trying to escape the reach of the stalkers.  However, since these offenders had not 
physically harmed the victims, no remedy was available to the victims or to law 
enforcement.49  This example demonstrates a situation in which the victims were 
clearly harmed, but because such harms were previously only conceptualized as 
bodily harm, the law was inadequate and provided no relief or redress for the 
victims.  Therefore, the first anti-stalking laws emerged in the 1990s, and 
subsequently, forty-nine states and the federal government had an anti-stalking or 
anti-harassment crime by 1996.50  Thus, the law adapted to a new reality of the 
crime of stalking through understanding the crime’s parameters and recognizing 
that the motive of offenders was not always violence but also included elements of 
obsession, real or imagined relationships, and control.  As explored in later 
sections, the criminal further adapted when offenders started to utilize new 
technologies in the commission of the crime and expanded to include cyber 
stalking and cyber harassment laws.51 
Therefore, the idea that society should consider significantly altering the 
criminal code by recognizing the digital person as an extension of oneself through 
which the actual person can be profoundly harmed, is not revolutionary.  Similar 
transformational shifts occurred, such as expanding the concept of crime, which 
was previously limited to include crimes against a person to include crimes against 
property.  Such alterations have also taken place in smaller contexts, such as 
understanding the societal harms of crimes like harassment, stalking or threats, and 
how the criminal law has adjusted to recognize such harms.  Finally, technological 
shifts, such as mass media, the Internet, cellular devices, can create new harms 
experienced by victims as well as new socially-protected interests.  As such, the 
criminal law should recognize this third dimension of victimization within the 
context of personal crime. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
48  Id. at 273. 
49  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STALKING, AND 
ANTISTALKING LEGISLATION: AN ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN ACT 5 (1996) [hereinafter NIJ REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
50  Id. 
51  See discussion infra Section V.C. 
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V. THE LAW RECOGNIZES EXTENSIONS OF THE SELF IN A VARIETY OF CONTEXTS 
 
The suggestion of recognizing the digital person as an extension of the 
physical person is not as radical as it may first seem.  The criminal law has a rich 
history of understanding harms to the person that occur outside the physical realm.  
Crimes, such as sexually-abusive images of children, stalking and harassment, and 
identity theft, to name a few, are instances where the criminal law has recognized a 
relationship between the person and the extension of the person beyond his or her 
physical body.  Accordingly, recognizing a separate category of personal crime, 
i.e. that the digital person is an extension of the person, is a natural outgrowth of 
this precedent.  The distinction between these isolated cases of the past and the 
need for a more contemporary, comprehensive approach highlight the nature of our 
inter-connected world.  With each of these aforementioned changes in the criminal 
law, the law was responding to a new, but narrow, form of victimization.  With the 
advent of the Internet and digital communications, all people have the potential to 
create a digital presence as an extension of themselves where this presence has 
emotional, financial, and commercial implications.  As such, its protection, 
particularly when understood as an avenue to the actual self, is a socially-valuable 
interest. 
The following section examines some areas where the law has recognized a 
form of a person’s digital extension.  These will include sexually abusive images 
of children, “revenge pornography, also known as non-consensual pornography, 
identity theft, and stalking/harassment.  While not an exhaustive list, these 
examples support the reality that the law has already recognized such extensions of 
the person in particular context.  The time has come for the law to do so in a more 
comprehensive manner. 
 
A. Sexually Abusive Images of Children 
 
In 1982, the Supreme Court categorized sexually abusive images of children 
as unprotected speech.52  From the very beginning and throughout this 
jurisprudence, the Court recognized that one of the reasons these images are 
unprotected is the fact that the images themselves are harmful to the children 
depicted in them.  More recently, the Supreme Court explicitly advanced this 
position by unequivocally recognizing that the children themselves are 
revictimized every time a possessor views the images.53  A review of the Court’s 
jurisprudence over these intervening two decades reflects a clear understanding 
                                                                                                                                          
52  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).  The Supreme Court referred to these images as 
“child pornography” in 1982, as that was the accepted term.  Since that time, however, the preferred 
term is Sexually Abusive Images of Children.  See e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Death to Child Erotica: 
How Mislabeling the Evidence Can Risk Inaccuracy in the Courtroom, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 
1, n.1 (2009). 
53  See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (2014). 
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that the images themselves harm the actual person and, by implication, that those 
images are in some way an extension of the person.   
In New York v. Ferber, the Court articulated several reasons to find sexually 
abusive images of children unprotected.  These reasons reflected what Professor 
Audrey Rogers has labeled the “dual justification” for not affording First 
Amendment protection to sexually abusive images of children: a concern for the 
actual and threatened harm to children inherent in both the production and 
distribution of sexually abusive images of children.54  The Ferber Court 
specifically recognized that the “use of children as subjects of pornographic 
materials is harmful to the psychological, emotional, and mental health of the 
child.”55  But more importantly, the Court saw that children were harmed by the 
images’ existence themselves, not just by the circumstances surrounding their 
production.  The Court noted that the images were “permanent records of 
children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their 
circulation.”56  According to the Court, the “nature of the harm” was not the 
exploitive production, but the “visual[] depict[ion] [of] sexual conduct by children 
below a specified age.”57  Indeed, the Court endorsed the view that the existence of 
the images may be the greater harm to these children: 
 
Pornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than does 
sexual abuse or prostitution.  Because the child‘s actions are reduced to a 
recording, the pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the 
original misdeed took place.  A child who has posed for a camera must 
go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within the mass 
distribution system for child pornography.58 
 
In 1990, the Court furthered this understanding of the images themselves 
harming children when it found in Osborne v. Ohio that the possession of sexually 
abusive images of children was also not protected by the First Amendment.59  In 
line with the rationale in Ferber, the Osborne Court saw that the very existence of 
these images negated a socially valued interest because this “pornography’s 
continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the 
children in years to come.”60 
In a slight deviation from this jurisprudence, the Court in Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition held that that virtual child pornography did not fall under the 
                                                                                                                                          
54  Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 856 (2008). 
55  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. 
56  Id. at 759 (emphasis added). 
57  Id. at 764. 
58  Id. at 759 n.10 (emphasis added) (citing David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual 
Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 Wake Forest L. Rev. 535, 545 (1981)). 
59  Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
60  Id. at 111. 
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Ferber definition of child pornography or sexually abusive images of children.  
However, the Court emphasized that this analysis did not diminish the Court’s 
previous understanding that the images themselves harm the children.61  The thrust 
of the Ashcroft Court’s opinion focused on the first justification articulated in 
Ferber: the harm to children in production of such images.  Accordingly, the 
Ashcroft Court concluded that no harm occurred in the production of such images 
because the children in the images were virtual and not real children.  However, 
the Court did not retreat from its articulation that the images themselves cause 
harm.  In fact, the Court noted that morphed child pornography—i.e. sexually 
abusive images of children created from a non- pornographic image of an actual 
child—are more akin to the concerns in Ferber than are virtual images that do not 
contain any depiction of real children.62  That is to say that the Court drew a 
distinction between images that are digital extensions of actual people (morphed 
and real child images) and those that were not. 
If there was any doubt of the Court’s position regarding the social harm 
caused by the existence of the images, it was removed in the recent case of 
Paroline v. United States.  Although the Paroline Court did rule against the 
victims when it held that a victim may not receive restitution from a possessor of 
sexually abusive images of children without first establishing the possessor 
proximately caused the harm, it also explicitly recognized the victims of images 
are acutely harmed with the knowledge of each viewing of those images.  The 
socially valuable interest that is compromised with the possession of such images 
was most clearly articulated by the following: 
 
The full extent of this victim's suffering is hard to grasp.  Her abuser took 
away her childhood, her self-conception of her innocence, and her 
freedom from the kind of nightmares and memories that most others will 
never know.  These crimes were compounded by the distribution of 
images of her abuser's horrific acts, which meant the wrongs inflicted 
upon her were in effect repeated; for she knew her humiliation and hurt 
were and would be renewed into the future as an ever-increasing number 
of wrongdoers witnessed the crimes committed against her.63 
 
Moreover, the Court explicitly endorsed the view that possession of such 
images and the subsequent viewing of these images was itself an exploitive act that 
revictimized the child.64  “It would be inconsistent . . . to apply the statute in a way 
that leaves offenders with the mistaken impression that child pornography 
possession (at least where the images are in wide circulation) is a victimless 
                                                                                                                                          
61  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002). 
62  Id. at 242. 
63  Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (2014) (emphasis added). 
64  Id. at 1727. 
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crime.”65  The only way that such could be the case is if the treatment of the image 
was considered an extension of the self.  Thus, the Court’s child exploitation 
jurisprudence clearly articulates that a person is victimized when their digital self 
is exploited. 
 
B. Non-Consensual or “Revenge” Pornography 
 
A rapidly emerging area of the criminal law that clearly demonstrates this 
recognition of the harm to the person through the targeting of the digital person is 
the area of non-consensual or “revenge” pornography.66  “Revenge pornography” 
refers to a nude or sexually explicit image that is shared publicly without the 
consent of the victim.67  It often references an intimate image or video that was 
initially shared between two people in an intimate relationship with the expectation 
that it will remain private.68  However, the images are not always produced with 
the consent of the victim, or with the knowledge of any of the subjects depicted.69  
They can be shared by the victim or taken from her by a hacker.70  
Regarding distribution, this dissemination can take many forms including 
sharing the image with other people; posting the image on a web site designed to 
injure such victims; posting the image and accompanying it with identifying and/or 
disparaging remarks regarding the victim; mass sharing to communities such as 
classmates, cities and towns, groups; or targeting its distribution to specific persons 
such as employers, family members, and paramours.71  Often such a distribution 
occurs after the end of an intimate relationship.  However, non-consensual 
                                                                                                                                          
65  Id. 
66  When this issue first reached public discussion, it was labeled as “revenge porn.”  
However, with legislation and scholarship addressing the issue, some have preferred the label “non-
consensual pornography.”  Each term is both descriptive and inadequate.  “Revenge” connotes the 
frequent intent behind this behavior.  However, it also suggests a motive that may not necessarily be 
present. Much more problematic and improper is the use of the word “porn,” which is a slang term, 
and slang, by definition, connotes something light, flippant, or harmless.  Mary G. Leary, Worth a 
Few Appalled Words, LEGAL TIMES (Dec. 17, 2007) (discussing the problems of the word “porn”). 
“Non-consensual” is arguably more inclusive but focuses on the behavior of the victim, not the 
behavior of the offender.  This article will use the terms “revenge pornography” and “nonconsensual 
pornography” interchangeably and consistent with the definition that follows. 
67  Taylor Linkous, It’s Time for Revenge Porn to Get a Taste of Its Own Medicine: An 
Argument for the Federal Criminalization of Revenge Porn, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2014). 
68  See, e.g., Adrienne N. Kitchen, The Need to Criminalize Revenge Porn: How a Law 
Protecting Victims Can Avoid Running Afoul of the First Amendment, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 247, 
247–48 (2015); Aubrey Burris, Hell Hath No Fury Like a Woman Porned: Revenge Porn and the 
Need for a Federal Nonconsensual Pornography Statute, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2325, 2327–28 (2014). 
69  Burris, supra note 68, at 2333–34; Kitchen, supra note 68 at 247–48. 
70  Linkous, supra note 67, at 3. 
71  See id. at 3–4. 
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pornography events have occurred when an offender hacks into an account of the 
victim and shares the pictures.72 
Of particular concern are situations in which the images are posted on 
websites designed for public sharing such as IsAnyoneUp.com, UGotPosted.com 
or MyEx.com.73  One such website owner actually required the subject’s 
identifying information for submission of images to UGotPosted.com, and then 
charged victims hundreds of dollars to remove them through 
changemyreputation.com.74 
Regardless of the exact form of the victimization, the harm is very tangible 
and unique to these victims.  Victims experience extreme invasions of privacy 
which cause them to suffer severe psychological trauma, emotional trauma, 
personal trauma, professional ruin, and property losses.75  Ultimately, victims’ 
reputations are destroyed.76  Similar to victims of sexually abusive images of 
children, victims of revenge pornography suffer the perpetual harm of their explicit 
images being available on the Internet for eternity without an ability to retrieve or 
delete them.77  This brings the psychological trauma of wondering whether every 
person with whom they interact has seen these images. 
When the images are also connected with a phone number or other identifying 
information, the harm becomes more profound as they then contend with cyber 
harassment and stalking.78  Victims are often stalked both in person and 
electronically, being subjected to receiving massive amounts of pornography or 
obscene messages.79  Additionally, these victims suffer property losses.  They 
report having lost their jobs and being unable to obtain new positions.80  They 
suffer other forms of property loss including the costs of moving, changing their 
names, telephone numbers, and lives.81 
As this trend grew, as well as the public discovery of websites such as 
IsAnyoneUp.com dedicated to this anti-social behavior, the criminal law adjusted.  
Although not a crime against the physical body or property per se, many states 
                                                                                                                                          
72  See Mary Anne Franks, Combatting Non-Consensual Pornography: A Working Paper 3 
(Sep. 7, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336537. 
73  E.g., Linkous, supra note 67, at 6–7; Danielle Citron and Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing 
Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 368 (2014). 
74  Linkous, supra note 67, at 15. 
75  Citron and Franks, supra note 73, at 351–353; Snehal Desai, Smile for the Camera: The 
Revenge Pornography Dilemma, California’s Approach and Its Constitutionality, 42 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 443, 445 (2015). 
76  Franks, supra note 72, at 3–4. 
77  Id.; Linkous, supra note 67, at 13. 
78  Kitchen, supra note 68, at 248. 
79  Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224, 245 (2011) (hereinafter Avatars). 
80  Franks, supra note 72, at 4. 
81  Id. 
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clearly recognize the social harm of revenge pornography.  As a result, 
approximately fourteen states have adopted legislation to criminalize this behavior.  
This body of statutes is a clear example of the criminal law recognizing the abuse 
of the digital person as an abuse of the actual person because that image or persona 
is an extension of the self. 
These statutes vary widely.  Some statutes require the intent to cause harm at 
the time of dissemination.  Others do not do so.  Some statutory reforms include a 
private right of action, while others respond with a purely criminal reaction.  Some 
of the statutes limit criminal liability to the initial distributor.  However, there is 
one common theme amongst these varying state statutes: implicit in many of these 
statutes is the recognition of the digital extension of the person.  For example, New 
Jersey’s legislature recognized that “people have a right to control the observation 
of their most intimate behavior under circumstances where a reasonable person 
would not expect to be observed.”82  California’s law recognizes the “extreme 
humiliation of victims.”83  Delaware’s statute also recognizes the property loss and 
notes the “person depicted unwillingly becomes sexual entertainment for strangers 
and the person’s career and standing within the community can be negatively 
impacted.”84  All of these state findings exemplify an understanding that images 
are an extension of the victims, which by themselves, cause measurable social 
harms when exploited. 
 
C. Stalking, Harassment, and Cyber Bullying 
 
Within the context of crimes such as stalking, harassment, bullying, and 
threats, the criminal law has recognized harm to the person beyond the victim’s 
physical person.  It recognized the harm to the more intangible extension of the 
person.  As society migrates to more digital existences, the criminal law has 
adapted to modify crimes, such as cyber stalking and harassment, cyber bullying, 
and online threats.85  The criminal law’s recognition of the digital extension of self 
as a source of harm becomes clearer.  It also officially recognizes this form of 
harm, and creates more support for the proposal of this article. 
“Stalking” is defined as the culpable committing of a series of actions such as 
following or harassing that cause or are intended to cause fear.86  In the late 1990s, 
its criminalization began after the death of a well-known actress who had been 
stalked for two years.  Prior to the legislative response, law enforcement was 
somewhat unable to respond because any one of the acts alone was not likely 
illegal.  Therefore, law enforcement found itself in the unenviable position of being 
                                                                                                                                          
82  See Sen. Judiciary Comm. Statement to Sen. Comm. Substitute for Sen. No. 1031, 1 (N.J. 
1998). 
83  See generally S.B. 1255, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). 
84  H.B. 260, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014). 
85  See generally Lipton, supra note 32. 
86  NIJ REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 49, at 4. 
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unable to respond until the victim had been physically hurt, and in this case, 
murdered.87 
The crime of stalking can be understood to recognize harms to the intangible 
self as well as to the physical self.  Although not in all of the statutes, many states 
require some sort of intent to instill fear in the victim, but this intent can be 
inferred by knowing the contact is unwelcome.88  However, many states do not 
require proof that the suspect intended to cause fear as long as he intended to 
commit the acts that did cause fear.89 
The purpose of engaging in stalking is not always to cause physical harm to 
the victim.  It can be driven by anger or a desire for contact.  It has been found that 
defendants engage in this behavior for a variety of reasons including revenge, 
control, contact, or mental health issues.90  The harms experienced by victims of 
this relentless activity can include fear, hypervigilance, disrupted sleep, 
helplessness, anxiety, and PTSD.91 
In a post-digital world, the commission of these crimes has migrated to 
cyberspace.  “Cyberstalking” refers to situations in which the offender uses 
technologies such as email, texting, or devices to create a level of intimidation, 
harassment, and fear in his victims.92    While it may manifest within a different 
medium than stalking and bullying in the physical world, it is driven by the same 
factors and causes similar harms.93  However, these harms are more acute when 
they occur through the Internet because these attacks “transcend all physical 
boundaries, borders, and limitations.”94   
The advent of the Internet also provided the platform for increased incidents 
of stalking because the Internet provides both anonymity and access to many 
potential victims.  The anonymity allows the perpetrators to engage in more 
behaviors, to utilize more means such as email or cellular connections, and to do it 
at all times.  “[C]yberstalking, at least from a criminological and legal perspective 
represents an entirely new form of deviant criminal behavior.”95  The medium 
allows for actions such as connecting the victim to pornographic web sites, so that 
                                                                                                                                          
87  Id. at 3. 
88  Id. at 4. 
89  Id. at 6. 
90  Michael L. Pittaro, Cyber Stalking: An Analysis of Online Harassment and Intimidation, 1 
INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 180, 184, 186–87; see also NIJ REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 47, at 
5. 
91  Pittaro, supra note 90, at 191, 194.  Victim Jane McCallister testified before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee regarding the harm she suffered due to an acquaintance stalker. She noted that 
she lived “in constant fear…[and felt] powerless.  Though he was free to move about, I was living in 
a state of siege.”  NIJ REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 49, at 5. 
92  Pittaro, supra note 90, at 191.   
93  Id. at 191, 194. 
94  Id. at 180. 
95  Id. at 182.  
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she would receive pornographic images daily, stalking by proxy where a third 
party is used to stalk, or utilizing dangerous websites like payyouback.com, which 
allows stalkers to send anonymous emails.96 
Notwithstanding these more pernicious harms, the criminal law responded by 
enacting legislation that criminalized these specific forms of stalking and 
harassment.  All fifty states have some form of such legislation.97  Furthermore, the 
federal law has made it illegal to transmit threats across state lines using telephone 
or communication devices to harass or engage in interstate stalking.98 
Thus, the evolution of the law reflects an implicit recognition of the extension 
of self and the need to criminalize harming that extension.  The migration from 
stalking and harassment model to a cyberstalking model also endorses the concept 
that the social harm is distinct and arguably greater in the digital world than in the 
physical. 
 
D. Identity Theft 
 
Identity theft exemplifies a crime that has emerged in modern times, has been 
significantly altered in the digital era, and recognizes the digital extension of self.  
Many versions of identity theft can occur, which can blur its exact definition.  This 
article refers to “identity theft” as the obtaining and/or utilizing of pieces of 
personal information about another, often personally identifying information such 
as a social security number, for fraudulent purposes that include but are not limited 
to obtaining money or credit, avoiding criminal charges, or obtaining other 
documents.99  With the evolution of one’s online identity, simply more avenues 
exist through which to steal one’s identity, more ways exist to utilize that identity, 
and, therefore, more opportunities to harm the actual person.100  This is 
compounded by the reality that one’s digital reputation is increasingly important to 
one’s existence.  With this digital manifestation of harm, the criminal law has 
                                                                                                                                          
96  Id. at 185. 
97  Id. at 192.   
98  18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994) (sentencing a person who “transmits in interstate or foreign 
commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the 
person of another” to be fined and/or imprisoned for five years); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2013) 
(criminalizing obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or interstate or foreign 
communications). 
99  Beth Givens, Identity Theft, How It Happens, Its Impact on Victims, and Legislative 
Solutions before the Sen. Judiciary Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Gov’t Info (July 12, 
2000)(written testimony) [hereinafter Identity Theft, How It Happens] (written testimony of Beth 
Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse). 
100 Technology has changed the landscape: items on the Internet supposed to be private are 
accessible (email, text) to data harvesters, worms, keystroke loggers.  Conversely, information 
voluntarily shared is at risk to being obtained by data harvesters, retailers, or scrapers of information.  
SALLY M. GUY & KAREN D. MORGAN, DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERV., Identity Theft in Maryland 
(2013). 
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implicitly recognized the harm caused by the injury to the digital presence, in this 
case, the person’s identity.   
Various social harms have been associated with identity theft.  This crime was 
once categorized only as a property crime due to the financial losses experienced, 
not by the person whose identity was stolen, but by the commercial entity that 
suffered the financial loss of a fraudulent credit card or checking account.  Today, 
the criminal law recognizes that it is the harvesting of this personally identifiable 
information that is the problem, not just the thefts, which may result from this 
crime.  Offenders use or sell the stolen information so that criminals can use it for 
many purposes such as obtaining healthcare, prescription drugs, driving licenses, 
and avoiding criminal convictions or offender registration, just to name a few.  
Consequently, this criminal activity causes many more types of harm including 
emotional scarring from the personal violation and helplessness that results from 
trying to contain the damage and regain one’s identity, the risk of false arrest, or 
the risk of IRS accusations of under payment.101 
Many states recognize identity theft as a property crime and this is manifested 
in a variety of ways.  While some states include this crime within its larceny 
statute,102 others include property concepts within its elements103 or within its 
sentencing provisions.104  Property harms extend far beyond financial loss to the 
institution.  The actual victim spends more than 175 hours and thousands of dollars 
in the attempt to reclaim his or her name.105   
However, the harm caused by identity theft is not limited to property 
interests.106  Several states recognize the reality that identity theft victims suffer a 
panoply of harms.  These harms can include assuming credentials of a person to 
avoid criminal arrest or lead to the arrest of another.107  The reputational nature of 
the harm is also explicitly addressed in several states.108  They can also include the 
anxiety, frustration, and time spent trying to regain credit history and financial 
stability.109 
                                                                                                                                          
101 Identity Theft, How It Happens, supra note 99. 
102 E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-4.   
103 E.g.,720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-30 (requiring the intent to obtain property or commit a 
felony); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-4 (including, but not limiting liability to, situation in which a 
defendant “receives money or other property”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:67:16. 
104 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6604 (allowing restitution for those who suffer financial loss 
due to debt created by defendant); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:67:16. 
105 S.B. 425, 2003 S. Comm., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (citing Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and 
Federal Trade Commission). 
106 Even the jurisdictions that seem to focus on the injuries to property, recognize the non-
property harms through other statutes.  For example, California’s criminal code addresses false 
impersonation of another, acquiring of another’s credit information, or the publishing of information 
of this type under separate code sections.  CAL. PENAL. CODE §§ 529, 484(e), 484(j) (2001). 
107 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-113.20(a), 14-113.22(a)(i); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-27. 
108 E.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 943.201(2), 943.203. 
109 Identity Theft, How It Happens, supra note 99.  
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However, of most relevance to this article, is the recognition of the more 
intangible harms that stealing one’s digital presence may cause to the actual 
person.  This is most clearly demonstrated in the statutes that discuss emotional 
harm or the intent to cause emotional harm.110  Some of the broader statutes, 
however, simply forbid such activity when personal information is obtained or 
used with any intent to harm.111  Under federal law, an offender must simply have 
the intent to commit an unlawful act.112 
At the crux of this broadening conceptualization of the harm of identity theft 
is the understanding of the compounding harms created by the Internet and the 
extension of self.  Prior to the rise of the digital world, the crime did take place, but 
it required a dishonest employee or person to obtain the information physically 
through confiscating a credit card, receipt, or mail.113  Today, the information is 
widespread throughout the Internet or in possession of third parties inadequately 
protected from hacking.114  “The advent of personal and mobile technology has 
been a game changer, however, and has altered identity theft from one in which its 
prevalence ebbs and flows . . . to one with exponential growth.”115  With this 
growth comes the growth of social harms.  .  The criminal law is recognizing that 
those violations of one’s digital presence directly affect the actual person. 
 
VI. THE THIRD DIMENSION OF VICTIMIZATION: RECOGNIZING THE DIGITAL 
EXTENSION 
 
As technologies develop, the reach of our lives and our resultant 
connectedness are expanding into the digital realm.  All aspects of contemporary 
American life have migrated in this way.  That extension of ourselves is 
intertwined with who we are.  Consequently, we are responsible for the actions of 
our digital self since it is an extension of our physical selves.  Similarly, we also 
feel pain and suffering when it is harmed or exploited.  The nature of the harm is 
unique.  It is geographically and temporally limitless.  As such, it demands a 
specialized recognition and response. 
That extension of ourselves is a socially valuable interest and the law should 
strive to protect it.  Structurally, the criminal law must reflect this development.  
No longer should victims have to argue by analogy to establish a social harm.  
While criminal laws have adjusted and expanded on a crime-by-crime basis to 
encompass modern versions of victimizations, it is this piecemeal and uneven 
                                                                                                                                          
110 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 §37E(b); MD. CRIM. LAW § 8-301(b-1). 
111 E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.461. 
112 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006). 
113 Identity Theft, How It Happens, supra note 99, at 3–4. 
114 GUY & MORGAN, supra note 100, at 1. 
115 Id. 
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approach that leaves gaps in the law.  Moreover, such an approach fails to capture 
modern life which is lived in part on a third dimension—a digital one.  This is 
more than a temporary change.  Similar to the rise of electricity or the motor 
vehicle, this digital revolution has literally altered how the world functions, life is 
lived, and, therefore, how people are victimized.  It is time for a more 
comprehensive overhaul. 
This shift demands a third dimension be added to the familiar property—
personal crime dichotomy common in criminal law codes for personal 
victimization.  This should result in a separate section of criminal codes for crimes 
against the digital person as an extension of self.  The previous crime by crime 
approach to reform is inadequate.  A major overhaul of criminal codes is necessary 
because it more accurately reflects the social harm, it signifies the importance of 
these infractions, and it is not a disruptive alteration, but the culmination of a 
recognition that criminal victimization occurs in this realm.   
 
A. A Separate Section Reflects the Social Harm 
 
The harms of cyber victimization are unique.116  As discussed, these 
exploitations of the digital self can harm victims in ways that surpass the 
contemplated harms experienced in the non-digital world.  The omnipresence of 
cyberspace, the scope of its influence, and the quantity of people that can be 
reached all conspire to magnify harm to a previously unforeseen level. 
Yet, when prosecutors and courts seek to redress the injuries suffered, they 
are forced to utilize crimes or concepts from a different time.  By enacting a 
separate section to criminal codes, legislatures no longer must seek to put the 
proverbial square peg into the round hole, trying to expand current criminal law to 
meet new demands.  While some may argue a separate section of crimes might 
divorce these crimes from their historical predecessors —such as separating cyber 
stalking from stalking—this separation is the wiser path.117  Although related, the 
harms of cyber victimization are substantially distinct and more profound than 
their analogies in the physical world.  As such, creating a separate section in 
criminal codes for these offenses conveys the significance of the criminal 
conviction and the unique harms of these types of victimization.  Moreover, a 
separate section also offers an important statement about the magnitude of the 
harms.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
116 See supra Section III. 
117 See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American 
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635 (2005) (criticizing piecemeal modification of criminal 
codes). 
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B. A Separate Section Conveys the Seriousness of the Infraction 
 
As a criminal conviction represents the moral condemnation of a community, 
so do criminal codes represent the values of a community.  A critical aspect of an 
effective criminal code is that it groups offenses together in systems of related 
crimes, not simply adding new crimes as a result of random politically supported 
punishments.118 
A separate chapter conveys two important aspects of criminal law and society.  
It demonstrates that a community recognizes the significance of such 
victimizations and approaches these crimes with seriousness.  Categorizing the 
modern crimes by harm experienced rather than harm intended underscores the 
social value compromised.  Because the social harm of digital victimization is 
uniquely pernicious and involves the exploitation of the digital self, these crimes 
should be together under one section.  
 
C. A Separate Section Continues the Modern Development of Criminal Law 
 
Such a structural change also conveys a modernity necessary in criminal law.  
A separate chapter communicates not only an awareness of changing times, but a 
recognition that the trend of modern living is to become more digital.  Therefore, 
such a chapter communicates this modernity and demonstrates the criminal law is 
current, both in its understanding of the crime and its expectations of where society 
will migrate in the future. 
This restructuring is the most productive way for our criminal law to move 
forward.  For a criminal code to be recognized as legitimate, it must reflect 
contemporary values.119  That is not to say a criminal code should be amended with 
each trend.  Two circumstances indicate a need for change in criminal codes.  They 
should be amended when new forms of victimizations develop and the current law 
fails to protect.  Secondly, they should be amended when sustained structural 
changes in society occur.  Both conditions are present today. 
Society has seen laws adapt to major societal changes which lead to new ways 
of victimization.  For example, a motor vehicle code was created when 
automobiles grew in stature to become a staple in American life.  The ubiquity of 
automobiles meant that they were more than a passing fad, but an alteration of 
modern American life, not only for those who owned vehicles, but for all people.  
It expanded a permanent new way in which people could be victimized and 
                                                                                                                                          
118 See Paul Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten List, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 225, 233 (1997) (“A code should adopt a system of offenses, in which offenses are designed to 
work together.  Offenses should complement each other.”). 
119 Robinson, supra note 118, at 264 (noting the necessity of the criminal law earning a 
“reputation as a reliable statement of what the community…perceives as condemnable”). 
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demanded the law reflect that reality.120  The same is true for the advent of the 
Internet and other digital communications.  The Internet is today a “vital 
infrastructure” in America.121  It is “essential to functioning in today’s society.”122  
If an essential component of life, victimization occurs within it.123  Therefore, it is 
equally as essential that criminal codes reflect this new reality and protect citizens 
as they function in that society grows and develops.  Such victimizations will only 
increase as we grow.  Spending more time online, translates to more opportunity 
for crimes and more types of crime.  Therefore, society must recognize that trend 
and have a criminal code that reflects it.  The old crimes can only be analogized to 
a finite amount of changes.  Ultimately, however, with individual’s lives migrating 




The law is organic and nowhere is this felt more acutely than the criminal law.  
The number of methods that can be used to victimize a person is limited only by 
the imagination of the deviant mind seeking to cause such social harm.  Therefore, 
this body of law is constantly adapting to new forms of victimization.  Technology 
has permanently altered how Americans live.  The criminal law should reflect this 
fundamental shift as well.   
The purpose of the criminal law is to protect socially valuable interests.  
Jurisprudence in other areas indicates that the law has recognized crimes that 
protect interests beyond the person or property, but extensions of the self.  It has 
further acknowledged the unique harms experienced by the victim when that 
extension is the target of misdeeds.  The criminal law must explicitly convey that 
by abandoning the two dimensional construct of crimes against the individual and 
embrace this third dimension.  By recognizing the social harms caused by targeting 
the online extensions of ourselves, criminal codes will advance the very purpose of 
the criminal law to protect citizens.  
                                                                                                                                          
120 DEWITT BLASHFIELD, BLASHFIELD’S CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW iii (1927) (“The 
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